Walter Kasper brings to light the religious quest for Jesus Christ in a secular, historical world. Taking up the turn towards anthropology and demythologisation, he sets out to rationally articulate the logic of faith in which Jesus is recognized as the Christ. Pursuing this quest, he develops a theological discourse on freedom, redemption, and self-transcendence.
Emmanuel Levinas, which will proffer, if you like, a 'Levinasian' reading of Kasper's 'Religious Quest for Jesus Christ.' 1 At specific instances, Levinas would direct his writings towards Christianity and theology, so as to draw parallels between his own thinking and Christian life and thought. In his essay, for example, 'Philosophy, Justice and Love,' he writes:
When I speak to a Christian, I always quote Matthew 25; the relation to God is presented there as a relation to another person. It is not a metaphor: in the other, there is a real presence of God. In my relation to the other, I hear the Word of God. It is not a metaphor; it is not only extremely important, it is literally true. I'm not saying that the other is God, but that in his or her Face I hear the Word of God.
Granted that the way in which 'God reverberates' 2 in the Other's face is an enigmatic phenomenon beyond our knowing, we are nonetheless commanded and ordained to a relation of responsibility for the other. 'In German-speaking theology, it was Karl Rahner and Has Urs von Balthasar above all who set the standard for the break-through in our century; and this was so even though their ways were later to part to some degree -or perhaps for that very reason' (Walter Kasper, Theology and Church [New York: Crossroad, 1989 ], 1).
the quest for the person of Christ with a logic and rationale that uncovers the inner truth of human existence and freedom.
We might ask what drives Kasper to develop a logic of faith and salvation that touches the heart of human history, freedom, and existence. It is faith and hope in the word of salvation that Jesus is the Christ. Whereas von Balthasar underlines, dramatically, the sense of Christ's mission being one with his person in God and as God, Kasper reflects upon the quest for Jesus the Christ with a contemporary, historical, and personal urgency that underscores a salvific and kerygmatic concern for our present human condition.
Kasper diagnoses a critical crisis in secular society. Having fallen into relativism and an understanding of the world that is centred on subjectivity, society has created egoistically an idol, namely, its self as the measure of all things. Experience, freedom, and history are but modes of being-for-oneself. Wary of the enlightenment's self-certainty and its ultimate fall into irrationality, Kasper brings to light the very truth that Jesus is the Christ. To this end, he connects Christology to soteriology. He utilises, furthermore, the language of ontology and phenomenology, adding to them aspects of existentialism. Such an approach, in some respects, bears a resemblance to Heidegger's Being and Time. Kasper Kasper's philosophical-theological writings express a faith in search of wisdom, love, and service. Moreover, his message testifies to an unveiling of the human person before God:
that our being (existence) and our experience (consciousness, emotions, perceptions, and desires) find fulfilment in self-transcendence, a state in which we find hope and ultimate meaning in Jesus the Christ. In mapping out his quest, Kasper considers the logic of faith with respect to four areas of the modern world's own quest for meaning: a secularised world, demythologisation, anthropology, and finally history.
The Challenge from a Secularised world
Kasper's theology of 'the Religious Quest for Jesus Christ' begins with a programmatic and compelling statement of faith: 'The confession that "Jesus is the Christ" is the answer to the question of salvation and redemption.' 7 This is the whole theological logic that underlines the religious quest for Jesus Christ in a secularised world. Immediately, we note a kerygmatic concern that takes to heart the fundamental question from Matthew's gospel: 'Are you the one who is to come, or shall we look for another?' (Matt 11:3).
Underlying Kasper's approach is a challenge to Rahner's anthropological turn to the subject, and particularly, to his emphasis on an implicit assent of faith in the idea of 'anonymous Christianity. ' We can see Kasper' s concern that such an embryonic assent of faith might not only be reductive, but also skewed in its anthropology. If God is indeed personal, then it is a personal 'yes' in faith that is the only appropriate response to him. Kasper's critique of society defines the concerns of our post-modern condition in which we so easily lose ourselves both in relativism and in a naïve and reductive rationalism. In such a context the search for the transcendent has been more or less abandoned in favour of other more 'meaningful' this-worldly (secular) pursuits, such as those of economics and science.
Kasper's concern is to awaken, or even surprise, the secularised world, through rational argument, to its real meaning and truth (the very Logos of God). When humanity assesses and treats the world from within its own parameters, the tyranny and 'bad faith' of public opinion clouds the religious quest. We can, as a result, become forgetful of one another's needs and fears, and subservient to both a depersonalised existence and a reality that has become absurd for us.
In Levinasian terms this could be characterised as an 'existence without existents.'
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In describing being in terms of fear and horror, as an anonymous and depersonalised state of existence, Levinas' phrase, there is (il y a), connotes this 'existence without existents.' 14 As the horror that strips consciousness of its subjectivity, the there is depicts a frightening ambiguity: the inability to ascertain the presence or absence of anything. 15 Metaphorically, he 12 Ibid., 41. To present the world as a problem to be completely solved is already to deny the place, and importance, of mystery. 'Man believes that he is in the process of increasingly understanding the real causes of things, and that he is coming more and more to master and control them.' 18 We can see that Kasper is wary of humanity's arrogance in presuming absolute power over the world and things. The paradox is that the more powerful we become, the more powerless we actually are, as we refrain from defining ourselves in terms of 16 Ibid., 62. 17 Ibid., 42. 18 Ibid.
mystery. Thus, we can begin to understand and appreciate Kasper's critique of subjectivity and its accompanying reductionism.
As a means of articulating the Christ event, Kasper favours the category of emancipation as opposed to subjectivity. Over against Bernard Lonergan's observation that 'genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity,' 19 Kasper's perspective on subjectivity appears rather negative. Presently, moreover, many Christian theologians find Emmanuel Levinas' emphasis on ethical subjectivity to be of significant import, in that it releases the subject from being defined by means of an anonymous and depersonalising objectivity (in the form of knowledge and self-interest). Levinas aims at an ethical subjectivity that is beyond any form of philosophical objectivity. Truth does not depend on objectivity and the meaning of being in general, since it is now much more a testimony of responsibility for the other, which goes beyond the conatus (effort) of philosophical intelligence. 20 Nonetheless, Kasper's logic is important since it takes us along his quest from (egoistic) subjectivity towards emancipation, so that we might take the next important step, namely, to the category of redemption.
Kasper observes that 'it is a fundamental question for modern Christology to decide the relation between redemption understood in a Christian perspective and emancipation understood as the modern age understands it.' 21 We are faced with two competing categories:
the theological category of redemption and the historico-philosophical category of emancipation. The question then is how we can make the religious category of redemption and hence give it a religious foundation for a secularised world.
The Demythologization of Belief in Christ
According to Kasper, secular thought tends to demythologise Christian faith and its mysteries in a destructive way by presenting the content of faith as mythological and uninspiring for today. In effect, secular thought severs Christian faith from the discourse on truth in the name of purifying human reason from 'mythic' conceptions.
When human freedom and maturity become the dominant midpoint and criterion of thought, traditional religious ideas and convictions must appear mythological. The traditional faith in Jesus Christ has also incurred the suspicion of being mythological.
… Surely, out of intellectual honesty and for the sake of a more genuine idea of God, we have to demythologise the whole thing? The governing idea behind the demythologisation project, however, is not one of elimination, but of interpretation. The aim is to discover the meaning of the objective core of the event -'to reveal the lasting content and intention in a way appropriate to the modern mind.' 24 But how 'appropriate' is this process, when a negative rationalization accompanies it? Given this problem, Kasper broadens the picture, observing that the roots of the demythologisation process are to be found in the context of humanity renewing its understanding of being (in the modes of existence and reality).
The Meaning of Being
Although Kasper does not deal specifically with the issue, we can see a development in the modern mind in its understanding of the meaning of being. By means of existentialism, anthropology, and ontological phenomenology, the modern mind has acquired the tools to 23 Kasper defines myth as 'the form of understanding proper to an out-of-date epoch of human history: the primitive era, or childhood, or mankind. In that epoch, man was not aware of the real causes of things, and therefore he saw supramundane and divine powers at work everywhere in the world an in history.' Furthermore, according to Kasper, mythology is 'the mode of thought and imagination which understands the divine in a worldly form, and the worldly in a divine form. 
The Risks of Theological Discourse
Kasper sets out on a religious-theological quest to discover how God relates to humanity, and how the world might reveal God. In this a fundamental question is raised on the viability of theological discourse. 'We have to ask whether and how far theological discourse and discussion are really possible and meaningful.' 33 This is a vital question for which there is no ultimate answer -it is the same as asking: 'What is the meaning of being?'
At once, Kasper's religious quest is a search for a rational way of articulating God, whilst acknowledging the importance of transcendence and mystery.
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In the quest for a logic of faith, Kasper describes the problems encountered by the 'emancipation, enlightenment and demythologisation movement of recent years,' 35 such as 33 Ibid. 34 Levinas seeks also to explore the logos of God without thematizing God's divinity. He speaks of the rather enigmatic idea of illeity to express how God commands the self in order to testify to his glory. In this sense theological language could be described as the gift of self for the other, that is in Levinasian terms, the un-thematizable sign of God's trace (illeity), which orders and commands the self to a life of responsibility for the other. In such ethical transcendence, the self does not succumb to the temptation of consciousness to betray the divine word. Christ's Easter exaltation and transfiguration, which is effected in the world through the work of the Spirit. There is a danger here of reducing theology to objective categories, which fall ultimately into the irrationality of being forgetful of mystery-in the sense of maintaining that passivity of letting-oneself-be-encountered-by-mystery.
In response to Kasper, I would suggest that it is a personal relationship of faithfulness to Christ amidst suffering that offers what is more a resolution than an answer to the question of theodicy. We cannot ultimately put our faith in answers, but rather in the divine person of Jesus Christ. Moreover, the person of Christ is more than an answer; Christ is a divine person who is beyond proofs, demonstrations, and explanations. We need to question any theodicy that is founded merely on logical proofs. Levinas What produces the thrust of hope is the gravity of the instant in which it occurs. The irreparable is its natural atmosphere. There is hope only when hope is longer permissible. What is irreparable in the instant of hope is that that instant is a present.
The future can bring consolation or compensation to a subject who suffers in the present, but the very suffering of the present remains like a cry whose echo will resound forever in the eternity of spaces. 40 Levinas wrote this not long after the Second World War. This language of hope is a commanding response of faith not only to his time of captivity in a German stalag, 41 but also 39 Ibid., 99. 40 Levinas. Existence and Existents, 89-90.
41 Against his experience of being regarded as a name-less non-existent while in captivity, Levinas laments: 'In horror a subject is stripped of his subjectivity, of his power to have private existence. The subject is depersonalised. 'Nausea,' as a feeling for existence, is not yet a depersonalisation; but horror turns the subjectivity of the subject, his particularity qua entity, inside out. It is a participation in the there is which returns in the heart of every negation, in the there is that has 'no exits.' It is, if we may say so, the impossibility of death, the universality of existence even in its annihilation' (Levinas, Existence and Existents, 61).
See also Levinas' essay, 'The Name of A Dog, or Natural Rights' in Emmanuel Levinas, But the attempt to understand God and Jesus Christ in terms of the kenosis idea must be antecedently aware that such an understanding must not turn into a wisdom of this world but must hold fast to the folly of the message of the cross, which is the wisdom of God (cf. I Cor 1:18-31). The point of departure for such an attempt can therefore only be the testimony of the Bible and not some philosophy or other, whether classical metaphysics with its apathia-axiom, or idealism with its conception of the necessary self-renunciation of the absolute, or modern process philosophy. We must therefore resist all attempts, anticipated long ago in gnosticism, to turn the cross of Christ into a world principle, a world law or a world formula or to explain it as a symbol of the universal principle of 'dying and living again.' 52 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., 50.
Kasper's initial praise is, now, a lament. The passage highlights that Kasper is not only critical of transcendental anthropology, but also of such philosophies, as classical metaphysics, idealism, and modern process philosophy. Nonetheless, in questioning Rahner's metaphysics, Kasper does not succumb to the danger of falling into an anthropologicalcentred Christology, whereby the cross of Christ is misrepresented as a 'world principle,'
rather than the true reality of Christ's suffering out of love for us.
Whilst Rahner focuses on the fundamental experience of our human condition in the world, Kasper is perhaps more attentive to the limits of human consciousness and understanding. Such limits define our human existence in relation to absolute mystery. We must face our limits and embrace the mystery of the cross, the very folly of God's secret and hidden wisdom (1 Cor 2:7).
Kasper may even go as far as questioning Rahner's theological integrity: 'This constitutive tension between historical reality and transcendental possibility discloses the basic problem of Rahner's approach. We might put it in thesis form by saying that Rahner's approach is still largely within the bounds of the idealistic philosophy of identity and its identification of being and consciousness.' 53 Is Kasper suggesting that we have in Rahner's reasoning a pantheistic, rather than a panentheistic, system? Is it really justifiable for him to state that Rahner is forgetful of the transcendental conditions of knowing and unknowing? 54 53 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 50.
54 For his part, Rahner is aware of the structure of knowledge, that is, the conditions of knowing and unknowing. In a text on the knowledge and self-consciousness of Christ, Rahner writes: 'In preparing for our reflections proper, it should be stated first of all that knowledge has a multi-layered structure: this means that it is absolutely possible that in relation to these dimensions of consciousness and knowledge something may be known and According to Kasper, Rahner is forgetful of this structure of knowledge since he focuses more on the development of knowledge (its reality as one of becoming) than on its existential ground in mystery and enigma (where the truth of human existence converges in Christ). 55 It seems, in Kasper's mind, that Rahner has fallen into the temptation of confusing human consciousness with divine being or human being with divine consciousness. 56 This tells us that, for Kasper, the quest for the meaning of being does not depend first on redeeming anthropology, but on the proclamation of faith that Jesus is the Christ. Kasper's mind), to be forgetful of the key transcendental conditions of our relating with God in history, namely, the limitations of human consciousness and understanding. Christ to a specific time in history. The Christ event cannot be limited to just one instance in time or to one meaning; in fact its meaning permeates all time and every human heart. Its meaning is dependent on (divine) being, rather than on human knowledge. We can begin to see things as truly historical when we realise that, like Mary, we too can have a share in Christ's mission and life, and realise that the quest for salvation is an important source of meaning and truth for us.
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The Quest for Salvation in an Historicized World
In the spirit of Vatican II, Kasper analyses the transition in Catholic theology from having a static view of reality towards having a more dynamic and evolutionary one. The danger of the quest for Jesus Christ today is that of falling into a search for a 'temporal well 67 Ibid.
response to the search for a logic of faith in history, Kasper offers arguments from three viewpoints: existence, evil, and self-transcendence.
Existence
Kasper emphasises that all our knowledge is in the sphere of the infinite. If we ignore the infinite we are left only with facts (the facticity of our historical situation) and, hence, live separated from the truth. Acknowledgement of the infinite offers humanity space for 'freedom, decision and venture.' 77 Humanity is greater than the facts of our historical reality because of our relationship to God. Granted that the reality of our existence restricts us to the fact of living in the world (facticity), we, nevertheless, have a chance for freedom because of our relationship to the infinite. Thus we are caught between power and impotence, grandeur and poverty, or, transcendence and the limits of facticity.
Examining our existential state, Kasper introduces the theme of suffering. Our poverty is an experience of suffering. We suffer because we always already have an inkling of our greatness that is ultimately the possibility of relating to God. The very possibility of transcendence underlines for us that we can never truly reduce God to the totality of knowledge. It further points to the human person as an impenetrable mystery. The human person cannot be grasped or sufficiently explained through an objective knowledge.
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'Freedom as the transcendental definition or determination of human beings is not something that is factually "given". It cannot be objectively established and proved.' 79 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid., 54. 79 Kasper, Theology and Church, 66. 'How is human existence possible in this aporetic historical situation?' 80 In such words, Kasper asks how we are to live in a world in which we cannot find ultimately a rational answer for our existence. This is the perennial tragedy wherein we must discover meaning and truth. In its own terms, anthropology cannot give the final word on the meaning of our existence. But we can find a 'resolution' in God who is infinite truth. Kasper's quest for the meaning of divine being takes a turn towards the notion of freedom. In a complementary manner, for Levinas, the way of truth is directed to a life of difficult freedom, namely, having to take responsibility even in situations of humiliation and persecution.
Levinas will speak, therefore, of a 'persecuted truth' in a manner that is distant from the idea of truth as unconcealedness (Heidegger), or as presence in consciousness. The transcendent power of truth is experienced in being exposed to the destitution of the other. It is found in the trace or proximity of God in the other's face. In this formulation Levinas wishes to protect God's transcendence from onto-theological reductions.
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Evil
Kasper's second viewpoint, in developing a rational way of speaking of God, highlights the phenomenon of evil as a means to refine his reflection on existence. Christ in humility and solidarity, the more we can experience the truth of our freedom and of our existence. Our finite condition and the problem of evil are but obstacles to be negotiated as we move beyond the limits of our own being towards the otherness of divine being. We are to witness to the wisdom that Jesus is the Christ. In the hope of witnessing to such glory, we might truly discover ourselves in turning to Jesus Christ and asking: 'Are you he who is to come, or shall we look for another? (Mt 11:3).'
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The proclamation that Jesus is the Christ and Son of God is one that needs to be renewed for those who remain deaf and blind to the possibility of freedom and redemption through Jesus. Whilst on a philosophical level we may be unable to find the definitive answer to the question of the meaning of being, we may, on a theological level, begin to discern a response to the above question from Matthew's gospel in the realization that Jesus is the and his revelation that these make an impact on him, and for him become salvation' (Kasper, Theology and Church, 68).
